Illiquidity is well-known to be a signi…cant determinant of stock and bond returns. We report on illiquidity premia in equity option markets. An increase in option illiquidity decreases the current option price and predicts higher expected option returns. This e¤ect is statistically and economically signi…cant. It is robust across di¤erent empirical approaches and when including various control variables. The illiquidity of the underlying stock a¤ects the option return negatively, consistent with a hedging argument:
Introduction
The existing literature contains a wealth of evidence regarding illiquidity premia in stock and bond markets. It has been shown in both markets that illiquidity a¤ects returns, with more illiquid assets having higher expected returns. In equity markets, Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) , Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Amihud (2002) , Jones (2002) , Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) compare stock market illiquidity to ex-post returns on equities. In bond markets, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) , Warga (1992) , Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) , Kamara (1994) , Krishnamurthy (2002) , Longsta¤ (2004) There is also a growing body of evidence on the existence of illiquidity premia in other markets, see for instance Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2011) for evidence on interest rate derivatives and Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2010) for evidence on the credit default swap market. Vijh (1990) measures liquidity premia and market depth in the equity options market, and George and Longsta¤ (1993) measure bid-ask spreads in index options and explain the nature of cross-sectional di¤erences in these spreads. However, the literature has been mostly silent so far about the relationship between illiquidity and expected returns in equity option markets. This is surprising, because similar to stock and bond markets, market makers in option markets incur order processing and asymmetric information costs. George and Longsta¤ (1993) …nd that a substantial fraction of the bid-ask spread in option markets is attributed to premia compensating dealers for the risk of holding uncovered positions in illiquid options.
Our contribution is to study the e¤ect of option and stock illiquidity on equity option returns. We document the statistical signi…cance and economic magnitude of the impact of option illiquidity on option returns. We also estimate the e¤ect of illiquidity in the underlying stocks on option returns. In a frictionless, complete-market model, the price of the option can be replicated by trading in the underlying asset and a risk free bond. If the underlying asset is illiquid, then the trading strategy replicating the price of the option is harder to implement and the illiquidity costs of this trade should a¤ect the price and thus return of the option.
We establish our main results using cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for daily and weekly returns. We present univariate regressions but also multivariate regressions controlling for stock volatility, stock returns, lagged option returns, and other …rm characteristics, as in Duan and Wei (2009) . An increase in option illiquidity has a positive and signi…cant impact on next period's option returns, across all moneyness and maturity categories. This evidence is consistent with the existence of an illiquidity premium in the options market, similar to the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on stock returns reported by Amihud (2002) . The e¤ect is also economically signi…cant: for example, a two standard deviation shock to out-of-the-money short-term call illiquidity results in a 2.37% change in the next day out-of-the-money short-term call returns. A two standard deviation shock to out-of-themoney short-term put illiquidity results in a 1.61% change in the next day out-of-the-money short-term put returns.
We …nd that the illiquidity of underlying stocks also has a signi…cant impact on option prices. As expected, this e¤ect is opposite to the e¤ect of option illiquidity on option returns. A positive shock to stock illiquidity decreases next period's option returns. This …nding is consistent with trading motivated by hedging considerations. Whenever stock market illiquidity increases, the higher stock transaction costs will increase the cost of replicating the option, which will increase the option price and reduce its expected return. This e¤ect is also economically meaningful, although it is smaller compared to the impact of option illiquidity: for example, a two standard deviation shock to stock illiquidity would result in a 0.87% change in the next day short-term out of the money call returns and a 0.59% change in the next day short-term out of the money put returns. This is consistent with Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Warachka (2006) , who suggest that illiquidity of underlying stocks constitutes a signi…cant part of option prices.
Analyzing the e¤ects of illiquidity in the cross-section of option returns is empirically more challenging than analyzing the cross-section of stock returns, because of the strong dependence of option returns on the returns of the underlying. We therefore investigate the robustness of our results by analyzing the cross-section of implied volatilities in addition to the cross-section of returns. We …nd that both the illiquidity of the options and the underlying assets help explain the level of implied volatility, and that the sign of the e¤ect is consistent with the evidence from the cross-section of returns. Moreover, option illiquidity signi…cantly a¤ects the slope of the implied volatility curve: the implied volatility curve is steeper for more illiquid option contracts.
Finally, we report time-series evidence for liquidity decile portfolios. We …nd that a contemporaneous increase in option illiquidity has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on option prices, consistent with the cross-sectional evidence. This result is again similar to the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on stock returns reported by Amihud (2002) . A contemporaneous shock to option illiquidity decreases the current price and increases expected option returns to compensate traders for holding illiquid contracts.
To the best of our knowledge these results are new to the literature. The existing empirical evidence on equity option illiquidity is very limited. Using data from an interesting natural experiment, Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001) compare central bank issued and exchange traded options and report a 21% illiquidity discount for non-tradable central bank issued options. Cao and Wei (2010) document commonality in the illiquidity on equity option markets, but do not investigate the impact of illiquidity on option returns. 1 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our main hypotheses and discusses the theoretical literature on expected option returns. Section 3 describes the data and variables we use, in particular, the construction of option returns and illiquidity measures. Section 4 presents empirical results on the impact of illiquidity on the cross-section of option returns. Section 5 investigates the cross-section of implied volatilities and the slope of the implied volatility curve. Section 6 presents time-series evidence, and Section 7 concludes.
Mainstream option valuation theory assumes away illiquidity in option markets as well as in the market for the underlying and bond markets. 2 This is done in order to arrive at option valuation expressions that are deterministic functions of the underlying asset price and the interest rate as well as other variables, including volatility. In the standard Black and Scholes (1973) model, the option price, O; for a non-dividend paying stock with price S is a function of the strike price, K, the risk-free rate, r, maturity, T; and constant volatility, ; which we can write O = BS (S; K; r; T; ) (2.1)
Coval and Shumway (2001) show that in this basic model with constant risk-free rate and constant volatility, the expected instantaneous return on an option E R O is given by
where E R S is the expected return on the stock. The sensitivity of the option price to the underlying stock price (the option delta), denoted by @O @S , will depend on the variables in (2.1). The delta is positive for call options and negative for puts. Thus the expected excess return on call options is positive and the expected excess return on put options is negative.
The presence of E R S and
@O @S
on the right-hand side of equation (2.2) shows that it is critical to properly control for the return on the underlying stock when regressing option returns on illiquidity measures.
In the Black-Scholes model, the risk-free rate is assumed to be constant across maturities. Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) show empirically that allowing for stochastic interest rates does not change the value of the option by much, compared to the simple use of maturity-speci…c risk-free rates in the Black-Scholes model. Thus we do not control for stochastic interest rates in our empirical analysis below.
The absence of stochastic volatility in the Black-Scholes model is much more critical. Hull and White (1987) and Scott (1987) develop option valuation models with stochastic volatility. Heston (1993) develops a stochastic volatility model that allows for correlation between the shock to returns and the shock to volatility, as well as for a volatility risk premium to compensate sellers of options for volatility risk. Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2009) and Duarte and Jones (2007) show that in a standard stochastic volatility model, the expected option return is given by
where the sensitivity of the option price to volatility (the option vega), denoted by @O @
; is positive for all options, and where the price of volatility risk, , is negative because the added volatility risk increases the option value.
3 Equation (2.3) shows that it will be important to control for the dynamic volatility of the stock when regressing option returns on illiquidity measures. The standard option valuation models discussed above do not allow for transactions costs or liquidity risk. A much smaller option valuation literature allows for illiquidity e¤ects in the underlying asset. Prominent papers include Cetin, Jarrow and Protter (2004), Jarrow and Protter (2005) , and Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Warachka (2006). The latter paper shows that the Black-Scholes pricing model holds in the presence of liquidity costs associated with trading the underlying asset, but also that the optimal hedging strategy changes compared to Black-Scholes. Toft (1996) studies option valuation in the presence of trading costs. Perrakis (2002, 2007) , Oancea and Perrakis (2007) , and Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2009) rely on a stochastic dominance approach to characterize bounds on option prices. As this approach establishes option valuation bounds rather than option prices, expressions for the relationship between expected option returns and liquidity measures are not readily available.
In recent work, Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2010) develop an equilibrium asset pricing model with liquidity risk where the underlying asset is in positive net supply and the derivative asset is in zero net supply. The model contains heterogeneous investors who di¤er with respect to their degree of risk-aversion, initial wealth and investment horizon. In a linear special case of their model, the expected option return can be derived as
where IL O is the illiquidity (in terms of transaction cost) of the option and IL S is the illiquidity of the underlying stock. Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2010) show that when the less risk-averse investors have long positions in the option, the coe¢ cient on E IL O is positive and the option buyers will earn a positive illiquidity premium. These investors are more sensitive to transaction costs and will therefore require compensation for illiquidity risk. The model is not conclusive with respect to the sign of the coe¢ cient on E IL S , which therefore remains an open question in the empirical analysis, to which we now turn.
3 Data and Variable Construction
Option Returns
We investigate the impact of option illiquidity as well as stock illiquidity on option returns. The construction of these two measures is complicated by the large number of option contracts and the need to construct stock illiquidity measures using high-frequency data. Moreover, data on option contracts for smaller …rms is less readily available when researching longer time periods. We therefore limit ourselves to options data for S&P500 index constituents from OptionMetrics, which includes daily closing bid and ask quotes on American options, as well as their implied volatilities and deltas. By limiting ourselves to S&P500 …rms, we bias our results towards not …nding evidence of the importance of illiquidity. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2007. We limit the sample to …rms that have options trading throughout the entire sample period. We implement this by verifying whether the …rms have options trading on the …rst trading day of each calendar year in the sample, as well as the last day in our sample, December 31, 2007 . This yields a sample of 341 …rms. We repeat our analysis for six di¤erent option samples. For each …rm, we consider put and call options for two maturity categories: short-term, with time to maturity between 20 and 70 days, and long-term, with time to maturity between 71 and 180 days. Each maturity category is in turn divided according to moneyness into in-the-money (ITM), atthe-money (ATM), and out-of-the-money (OTM) options. We follow Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009) and Bollen and Whaley (2004) and de…ne moneyness according to the option delta from OptionMetrics, 4 which we denote by . OTM options are de…ned by 0:125 < 0:375 for calls and 0:375 < 0:125 for puts. ATM options correspond to 0:375 < 0:625 for calls and 0:625 < 0:375 for puts, and the ITM category is de…ned by 0:625 < 0:875 for calls and 0:875 < 0:625 for puts. Following Goyal and Saretto (2009) and Cao and Wei (2010), we apply …lters to the option data and eliminate the following contracts: (i) prices that violate no-arbitrage conditions; (ii) observations with ask price lower than or equal to the bid price; (iii) options with open interest equal to zero; (iv) options with missing prices, implied volatilities or deltas; (v) options with prices lower than $3 and bid-ask spread below $0.05, or prices equal or higher than $3 and bid-ask spread below $0.10, on the grounds that the bid-ask spread is lower than the minimum tick size which signals a data error. We have also re-run the empirical tests without imposing any …lters, and the results are robust.
For all remaining options, our method for computing option returns follows Coval and Shumway (2001) . We compute daily returns using quoted end-of-day bid-ask midpoints if quotes are available on the respective days. We compute equally-weighted average daily returns on a …rm-by-…rm basis for each moneyness and maturity category by averaging option returns for all available contracts. For each option category and for each …rm, the return from t to t + 1 is de…ned by
where N is the number of available contracts in the particular category at time t with legitimate quotes at time t + 1. O t (K n ; T n ) is the mid-point quote, (ask+bid)/2, for an option with strike price K n and maturity T n , and f t is the cumulative adjustment factor for splits or other distribution events, provided by OptionMetrics. Weekly option returns are constructed similar to daily returns using Friday-to-Friday data wherever possible, and alternatively using a minimum of four daily returns. Figure 1 plots the daily option returns over time. Figure 1A contains the call option returns and Figure 1B has the put option returns. The short-term returns in the left panels are clearly more volatile than the long-term returns in the right panels. This is true for both calls and puts. All the option returns display volatility clustering and strong evidence of non-normality. As is typical of daily speculative returns, the mean is completely dominated by the dispersion. Table 1 reports summary statistics. We …rst compute the respective statistics for each …rm and report the average across …rms. Table 1 shows that call returns on average are positive and put returns are negative, for daily data as well as weekly data in all categories. This is as expected from the option deltas as shown in (2.2). The option returns exhibit positive skewness and excess kurtosis in all categories as well, which is also as expected due to option gamma. Returns on OTM options are higher than returns on ITM options. They are also more variable and exhibit higher kurtosis. Returns on short-term options are higher and more variable than returns on long-term options, con…rming the visual impression from 
Illiquidity Measures for Stocks and Options
We investigate the impact on option returns of option illiquidity but also of illiquidity in the underlying stock market. There is an extensive literature on stock market illiquidity as we discussed in the introduction. We follow the convention in the literature and compute stock illiquidity as the e¤ective spread obtained from high-frequency intraday TAQ (Trade and Quote) data. Speci…cally, for a given stock, the TAQ e¤ective spread on the trade is de…ned as
where P k is the price of the k th trade and M k is the midpoint of the consolidated (from di¤erent exchanges) best bid and o¤er prevailing at the time of the k th trade. The daily stock's e¤ective spread, IL S , is the dollar-volume weighted average of all IL S k computed over all trades during the day
DolV ol k where the dollar-volume, DolV ol k , is the stock price multiplied by the trading volume.
The literature on equity option illiquidity is in its infancy, and therefore it is less clear how to de…ne the option illiquidity measure. Furthermore, transaction prices to estimate e¤ective spreads are not available for options. Similar to conventional illiquidity measures for stocks, we therefore measure illiquidity in the option market with relative quoted bid-ask spreads. 6 This is a transparent measure of illiquidity, and better alternatives are not readily available. 7 We compute relative quoted bid-ask spreads using end-of-day quoted bid and ask prices provided by Ivy DB OptionMetrics. 8 For each contract, we compute the daily relative quoted spread
where the prices O t (K n ; T n ), OA t (K n ; T n ); and OB t (K n ; T n ) are, respectively, the end of day closing mid-point, ask, and bid quotes reported in OptionMetrics, for an option with strike price K n and maturity T n . Note O t (K n ; T n ) = (OA t (K n ; T n ) + OB t (K n ; T n ))=2. 7 Dollar quoted bid-ask spreads are not a good alternative as liquidity indicators, because they are mainly driven by the maturity and moneyness of the option contract. See Cao and Wei (2010) for a discussion. 8 We use the following …elds in OptionMetrics: "Best bid"de…ned as the best, or highest, closing bid price across all exchanges on which the option trades. Similarly for "Best o¤er".
The equally-weighted average spreads are then computed for each option category as
where N is the number of available contracts that are within the particular category at time t.
Given the data constraints, using quoted spreads as an alternative to e¤ective spreads is reasonable. Battalio, Hatch and Jennings (2004) , who use data for January 2000 through June 2002, which is part of our sample period, …nd that for large stocks the ratio of e¤ective spread to quoted spread ‡uctuates between 0.8 and 1. Since our sample is limited to S&P500 …rms, quoted spreads are a good substitute for e¤ective spreads.
Panel A of Table 2 also shows that illiquidity is highest on average for OTM options, followed by ATM options, which in turn are more illiquid than ITM options. We therefore conclude there are strong moneyness and maturity e¤ects in liquidity. In order to control for this, we will run our empirical tests separately on six di¤erent moneyness and maturity categories.
An alternative to the use of relative spreads as an illiquidity measure is Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure, the price impact value, which is also considered by Bongaerts et al. (2010) . We construct this measure for options as follows: For each day and for each option category we compute the average return and the average dollar volume across all available contracts. Dollar volume is computed as the bid-ask midpoint multiplied by trading volume. We then compute the ratio of the absolute return to the dollar volume for each day and average it for each week. This is similar Amihud's (2002) implementation, with the di¤erence that we construct a weekly rather than a monthly measure. Table 3 reports summary statistics for Amihud's illiquidity measure. Across option categories, OTM options have the highest price impact value. This is consistent with the evidence on relative spreads in Table 2 , which shows that OTM options are most illiquid. Among other categories, similar to Amihud's (2002) price impact measure at lower than monthly frequencies, on the grounds that it yields a noisy estimate of illiquidity. We therefore use the relative spreads for our main results. Nevertheless, we replicate our main results using Amihud's (2002) measure, and we obtain qualitatively similar results. These results are available from the authors on request.
Trading volume and open interest are sometimes used as illiquidity measures. Table 3 reports on option trading volume and open interest. Table 3 shows that, as is well-known in the empirical option valuation literature, open interest and volume are highest for ATM and OTM options and lower for ITM options. So, while ITM options are the cheapest to trade in a relative bid-ask sense, which is our measure of liquidity, the ATM and OTM options have the highest trading volume. This is consistent with existing literature, which suggests that volume is not informative about illiquidity in option markets. For instance, Mayhew (2002) argues that an option can be liquid even if it has low trading volume. This may occur if other options on the same stock are actively traded. In that case it is easy for a market maker to hedge the low-volume option with actively traded options at other strikes and maturities, as well as to hedge calls with puts and vice versa. Therefore, when thinking of illiquidity in terms of trading costs, one should not expect an obvious relationship between illiquidity and trading volume in option markets. The apparent incongruity between option volume and trading cost also has interesting parallels to the literature on stock market liquidity. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) discuss the October 19, 1987 crash when the NYSE set a record in trading volume but where the stock market was highly illiquid from a trading cost perspective.
The right-most column in Table 2 shows that in our sample, stocks are on average substantially more liquid than options. The average relative bid-ask spread for stocks is 0.26% in our sample. This is lower than most estimates reported in the literature, which is due to the fact that our sample is limited to S&P500 …rms, which are the most liquid. Panel A of Table 2 also indicates that option illiquidity is substantially more volatile than stock illiquidity. Figure 2A depicts the evolution of our call illiquidity measure over time for all six option categories, and Figure 2B does the same for put illiquidity. For all six option categories, we report the average of the liquidity measure. Option illiquidity clearly declines over the sample period, but not in a monotonic fashion. As in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , we see occasional large spikes in the illiquidity measures. The largest spike took place on September [17] [18] 2001 , which were the …rst days of trading after the September 11 attacks. Smaller spikes occur towards the end of the sample as the credit crisis gets underway.
The top panel of Figure 3 plots stock illiquidity over time. Stock illiquidity clearly decreases over time, which the literature attributes to decreases in tick size, the increase in electronic trading, and decimalization. There are illiquidity spikes associated with the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 LTCM collapse, 9/11, and the WorldCom bankruptcy in 2002.
In order to put our liquidity data into perspective, Figure 3 also plots the S&P500 index level (middle panel) and the VIX volatility index from the CBOE (bottom panel). The inverse relationship between market returns and volatility, the so-called "leverage e¤ect" is evident when comparing the S&P500 level with VIX. Figure 3 also shows some evidence of dependence between spikes in stock illiquidity and spikes in the VIX.
Panels B and C of Table 2 show that option illiquidity has a sizeable positive correlation with stock market illiquidity for all option categories, with somewhat higher correlations for call options. This …nding suggests co-movement between illiquidity in the two markets. Table 2 also indicates that the illiquidity of OTM call and put contracts is substantially more volatile than the other categories. Illiquidity of OTM short-term calls and puts is highly correlated, at 0.59 (not reported in Table 2 ). This supports the …ndings of George and Longsta¤ (1993) , who suggest that traders regard call and put options as substitutes (via put-call parity) with trading activity in calls and puts being positively related to the bid-ask spreads in calls and puts.
Other Variables
We obtain daily stock returns, prices, and the number of outstanding shares from CRSP. Weekly stock returns are compounded from daily returns. Data on long-term debt and the par value of preferred stock, which are used to compute …rm leverage, are from Compustat. The S&P 500 constituents are also from Compustat. The returns on the Fama-French and momentum factors are from Ken French's online data library.
Illiquidity and the Cross-Section of Option Returns
We investigate the cross-sectional relationship between option illiquidity and expected option returns. We proceed by running daily and weekly cross-sectional regressions, and subsequently testing the signi…cance of the time-series means of the estimated coe¢ cients, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) .
Computing Adjusted Option Returns
Variations in the price of the underlying security are by far the biggest determinant of returns, and it is important to account for this when analyzing determinants of option returns as we showed in equation (2.2). The common practice in the literature is to use delta-hedged option returns. While this transformation is appropriate for studying factors a¤ecting option returns other than illiquidity, it creates a bias when testing the e¤ect of illiquidity on option returns. In particular, Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Warachka (2006) show that in a Black-Scholes economy with frictions, hedging does not eliminate the risk of the underlying stock. The hedging error due to the illiquidity of the underlying stock in ‡ates option prices. Therefore, using delta-hedged returns biases our test results for stock illiquidity. We instead proceed as follows: we …rst run a cross-sectional regression of option returns on the returns of the underlying stock and their lagged values. We also include squared stock returns to control for the nonlinear dependence between the two variables
2 + " i;t ; i = 1; 2; :::
and we refer to the residuals plus the intercept from these regressions as adjusted option returns, which we denoteR O i;t =^ 0;t +" i;t Below, we regress these adjusted option returns cross-sectionally on the illiquidity measures and a number of control variables. 10 
Capturing Liquidity E¤ects
Our treatment of illiquidity as an explanatory variable in the cross-section follows Amihud's (2002) investigation of expected stock returns, which is in turn inspired by the analysis of French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987). Table 2 reports average estimates of the …rst-order autocorrelation of individual illiquidity. The estimated values of (1) clearly indicate a rather persistent process, in line with the results for stock illiquidity reported by Amihud (2002) .
We compute the lagged illiquidity measure, IL O i;t 1 , as described in Section 3, for every …rm in the sample and use it as a measure of expected liquidity.
11 Following Amihud (2002) and French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), we use ex-post realized returns as a measure of expected returns. We run cross-sectional regressions of returns between times t 1 and t on the liquidity measure at time t 1; we also run similar regressions controlling for multiple other return determinants.
Since the illiquidity of the underlying asset can a¤ect trading activity in the option markets via hedging pressures, we also include our measure of stock illiquidity IL S i;t 1 .
Control Variables
We use a number of control variables in the liquidity regressions. To account for stale prices in the daily data, we include the lagged adjusted option return R O i;t 1 in the regression. Another important determinant of expected option returns is volatility, as we showed in equation (2.3). We estimate historical volatility from the daily stock return data using a simple GARCH(1; 1) model:
where R S i;t is the stock return, i is the conditional mean, 2 i;t is the conditional variance, and z i;t is a standard normal i.i.d. innovation. Duan and Wei (2009) argue that the proportion of systematic risk a¤ects the prices of individual options, and therefore option returns. We thus include b t 1 in the regression, which is the square root of the R-square from the regression of stock returns on the FamaFrench and momentum factors. Following Duan and Wei (2009), we obtain daily estimates of b t 1 by using one-year rolling windows to run daily OLS regressions of the excess stock returns on the standard four equity factors (the market, size and book-to-market factors from Fama and French, 1993 , and the momentum factor from Carhart, 1997). Furthermore, we control for …rm-speci…c characteristics such as size and leverage which have been shown to a¤ect the distribution of options prices, see for instance Dennis and Mayhew (2002) and Duan and Wei (2009) . Following Duan and Wei (2009),we measure size using the natural logarithm of the …rm's market capitalization. We de…ne leverage as the sum of long-term debt and the par value of the preferred stock, divided by the sum of long-term debt, the par value of the preferred stock, and the market value of equity.
ensuring consistency between returns and illiquidity used in the regressions. As a robustness check, we repeat the tests using illiquidity based on all contracts, and the results are qualitatively very similar.
Firm-Level Results using Daily Returns
Our most general cross-sectional regression is motivated by the theoretical model in Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2010), as discussed in equation (2.4) in Section 2. We run this regression with and without the control variables discussed above. The most general regression we consider is given bỹ R O i;t = t + 1;tR O i;t 1 + 2;t IL O i;t 1 + 3;t IL S i;t 1 + 4;t i;t 1 + 5;t b i;t 1 + 6;t ln(size i;t 1 )+ 7;t lev i;t 1 +" i;t (4.3) We run this cross-sectional regression on every day t using all …rms available for a given moneyness/maturity category, and subsequently compute the time-series averages of the estimated coe¢ cients. 12 These averages are reported in Table 4 . To control for serial correlation, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are corrected according to the Newey and West (1987) procedure using twenty-two lags for daily data. Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for daily call option returns for all moneyness/maturity categories, and Panel B reports on put options. For call contracts, option illiquidity IL O i;t 1 signi…cantly predicts higher option returns the next day at the 1% signi…cance level, across all maturity and moneyness categories. The coe¢ cient on IL O i;t 1 is statistically signi…cant when IL O i;t 1 is the only regressor, but also when including the control variables as in (4.3). Moreover, the IL O i;t 1 coe¢ cient is not much a¤ected when including the control variables. This suggests that option illiquidity is an independent determinant of option returns, and that its e¤ect is not captured by other well-known determinants of option returns.
Ignoring option illiquidity is tantamount to overestimating option prices. The e¤ect is also economically signi…cant. For example, for OTM short-term options, the coe¢ cient on IL O i;t 1 is 0.062. Table 2 indicates that the standard deviation for OTM short-term call option illiquidity is 0.191. Therefore, a two standard deviation positive shock to OTM short-term call option illiquidity would result in a 2.37% increase in the next-day return on the call option. This is a signi…cant magnitude for daily changes in prices. The coe¢ cient on IL O i;t 1 is higher for short-term contracts than for long-term contracts, implying that the illiquidity impact is especially pronounced for short-term options. Short-term OTM contracts have the highest illiquidity risk.
The positive predictive e¤ect of option illiquidity on expected option returns is consistent with existing …ndings on the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on stock returns (Amihud, 2002) . The positive contemporaneous illiquidity shock decreases current prices and thus increases the expected return over the next period. Option markets are characterized by a positive illiquidity premium, because buyers of illiquid contracts seek higher expected returns.
These results have implications for the option valuation literature. Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) and others …nd that S&P500 index options are relatively more expensive than individual equity options, particularly in the case of short-term and OTM options: Index options display much larger risk-neutral kurtosis, (negative) skewness and volatility than equity options. This is regarded as somewhat of a puzzle because an index is a portfolio of equities and so one would expect index options to display less evidence of nonnormality than individual equity options. Our results suggest that this valuation di¤erence could be driven by di¤erences in liquidity. Index options are well-known to be much more liquid than individual equity options. Thus individual equity option prices are relatively more depressed by illiquidity than are index options. This is particularly true for short-term OTM options where the di¤erence in pricing between index and equity options is the greatest.
Our results also have implications for option trading. In the well-known dispersion trade (see Driessen, Maenhout and Vilkov, 2009), investors sell index options, which are relatively expensive, and buy a portfolio of (cheaper) equity options as a hedge. This trade is commonly regarded as being driven mainly by correlation risk: When correlation increases, index options become relatively more expensive, which is bad for the dispersion seller. Our results suggest that this trade is also nontrivially exposed to liquidity risk because the equity options bought are much less liquid than the index options sold.
The illiquidity of the underlying stock IL S i;t 1 has a negative e¤ect on expected call option returns, and this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant for all categories of short-term calls and for long-term ITM calls. Given the positive coe¢ cient on IL O i;t 1 , the negative coe¢ cient on IL S i;t 1 is consistent with a hedging argument. When stocks become more illiquid, the higher stock transaction costs will increase the cost of replicating the option, which will increase the option price and reduce its expected return.
These results for short-term options are consistent with the evidence reported in Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Warachka (2006), who suggest ITM options are the least exposed to the illiquidity of underlying stocks, since with ITM options most of the rebalancing of option payo¤ replicating portfolios occurs only as the stock price decreases. This argument suggests the largest e¤ects for OTM options, where the replicating portfolio rebalancing occurs as the stock price changes in either direction, with ATM options somewhere in between. The coe¢ cient on IL S t 1 is more negative for OTM options, -2.077, and the least negative for ITM options, -0.428, with the coe¢ cient for ATM options being in between, -0.873. For long-term calls the e¤ect of stock illiquidity is less pronounced. Our estimate of -2.077 implies that a two standard deviation shock to stock illiquidity results in a 87 basis point change next day for short-term out of the money call returns. Therefore, while the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on call returns is small compared to that of option illiquidity, it is still economically meaningful.
Among other variables, the e¤ect of the lagged option returnR O i;t 1 is negative and signi…cant, which indicates negative mean reversion in option returns, consistent with the evidence on stock returns at the daily frequency. The volatility of the underlying also has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on expected option returns. This …nding is consistent with an option pricing model allowing for stochastic volatility and negative volatility risk premium (e.g. Heston, 1993) . As discussed in Section 2, in a stochastic volatility model, the expected option return, E R O ; is negatively related to volatility through the positive option vega,
, and the negative price of volatility risk, , as in equation (2.3), which we repeat here for convenience
Further, the proportion of systematic risk, b i:t 1 , is typically small and insigni…cant. Among …rm-speci…c characteristics, size exhibits a strong in ‡uence while leverage is typically insigni…cant.
For the put options in Panel B, we obtain similar results for option illiquidity IL O t 1 , which positively predicts next period put returns. This e¤ect is signi…cant across all moneyness and maturity categories in the univariate regression, but also when controlling for other variables. Also con…rming the results for call options, the e¤ect of put illiquidity on expected put returns is more pronounced for the short-term contracts compared to the long-term contracts. For example, the coe¢ cient on IL O i;t 1 for OTM short-term contracts is 0.048, almost twice the coe¢ cient for the long-term contracts, which is 0.023. In economic terms, the coe¢ cient of 0.043 implies that a two standard deviation shock to OTM short-term put illiquidity results in a 1.61% change in the next day put return. This is also an economically meaningful number.
The results for stock illiquidity are also quite robust for the put options. The coe¢ cient on IL S i;t 1 is negative in all six categories and signi…cant in four of six categories. The total risk i;t 1 has a signi…cant impact on put returns across all moneyness and maturity categories, whereas the e¤ect from the share of systematic risk, b t 1 , is small and insigni…cant. Among other …rm characteristics, size and leverage also seem to a¤ect put returns, consistent with the evidence in Dennis and Mayhew (2002) .
We veri…ed the robustness of the results in Table 4 by using raw option returns and including current and lagged stock returns as regressors. This yields very similar results for the variables of interest. The resulting R-squares are of course much higher, as the stock return explains a signi…cant part of the variation in option returns.
Firm-Level Results using Weekly Returns
Daily prices may be subject to problems such as stale quotes and microstructure noise. Table 5 therefore repeats the exercise from Table 4 using weekly data. To control for serial correlation, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are corrected according to the Newey and West (1987) procedure using eight lags. We classify the options as OTM, ATM, or ITM, as well as short-term and long-term according to their average delta and maturity over the week. The weekly results reported in Panel A of Table 5 for call options con…rm the results from Panel A of Table 4 . The coe¢ cients on lagged option illiquidity, IL O i;t 1 ; are robustly positive, and the estimates are statistically signi…cant. The coe¢ cients on lagged stock illiquidity, IL S i;t 1 ; are negative and statistically signi…cant. This is true for the univariate as well as the multivariate regressions.
The evidence on weekly put returns in Panel B of Table 5 also broadly con…rms the results from daily returns in Panel B of Table 4 . Option illiquidity is signi…cantly positively related to option returns in four of the six categories in the multivariate regression. Stock illiquidity is strongly negatively related with option returns for all categories.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 documents a statistically and economically signi…cant impact of option illiquidity on expected option returns. This e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on expected stocks returns (Amihud, 2002) and suggests a positive illiquidity premium in equity option markets. The call option results are robust to controlling for lagged option returns, stock returns, and stock volatility, as well as stock illiquidity and …rm-speci…c characteristics. Moreover, the illiquidity of the underlying stock has a signi…cantly negative impact on expected call and put option returns.
Portfolio Results
In the regression approach used in Tables 4 and 5 , noise in returns on individual option contracts may weaken inference. It is therefore of interest to con…rm the results using di¤erent empirical techniques. A simple alternative approach is to sort …rms in liquidity portfolio baskets, and investigate the resulting patterns in portfolio returns. This portfolio approach can reduce the noise in returns on individual contracts. Panel A of Table 6 presents portfolio results for daily call returns, and Panel B for daily put returns. Table 7 presents results for weekly data. At time t 1 (day or week) all options are sorted into liquidity deciles. Subsequently we compute the average option return, stock return, illiquidity and market capitalization for each decile portfolio at time t.
Consistent with the liquidity premium hypothesis, option returns are monotonically increasing from the most liquid decile portfolio to the most illiquid decile portfolio for both calls and puts. For the call options in Panel A, stock returns are increasing across decile portfolios, for daily as well as weekly data; for the put options in panel B, stock returns are decreasing across decile portfolios, as expected. Consistent with liquidity co-movement between stock and option markets, stock illiquidity monotonically increases with option illiquidity for both calls and puts, for weekly as well as daily data. It is also seen that the more illiquid …rms are on average smaller.
We can use portfolios to investigate whether returns on di¤erent horizon investments outweigh the substantial transaction costs. Similar to Amihud and Mendelson (1986), we compute returns net of transaction costs, using the bid and ask quotes. The net return R O net -Long is computed as (bid t ask t 1 )/ask t 1 and R O net -Short is computed as (-ask t +bid t 1 )/bid t 1 . Not surprisingly, the net returns after-trading costs for both long and short option positions are negative, clearly indicating that at short horizons liquidity premia are absorbed by market frictions.
Illiquidity and Implied Volatility
In Section 4, we study the impact of option illiquidity on the cross-section of option returns. This is a natural starting point, because it is straightforward to build intuition for illiquidity's expected e¤ects on returns. The existing literature on illiquidity in bond and stock markets also investigates the e¤ects of illiquidity on returns, and provides a natural reference point. However, there are some obvious di¤erences between the analysis of options markets and stock markets, and we have to keep these in mind when interpreting our results. Most importantly, even though an analysis of the e¤ect of illiquidity on stock returns also needs to control for other return determinants, in the case of option returns an overriding concern is that the return on the underlying is the …rst-order determinant of option returns (see equation (2.2)). As explained above, we control for this in our empirical work in Section 4 by either using the residuals from a regression on stock returns in our analysis, or alternatively by including stock returns in the regression. But it is worthwhile to investigate if our results are robust to an alternative empirical setup.
For equity options, an alternative approach is provided by the analysis of implied volatilities. This is interesting from two perspectives. First, the analysis of implied volatilities is well-established in the option literature. In fact, the importance of some of the control variables used in (4.3) was previously demonstrated in the context of the study of the structure of implied volatilities, see for instance Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) and Duan and Wei (2009) . Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2011), who study the e¤ect of liquidity on bond options, exclusively use implied volatilities as left-side variables, presumably because of potential problems with the analysis of returns. Second, because the structure of implied volatilities can simply be thought of as a (nonlinear) transformation of the structure of option prices, its analysis can be easily linked to the illiquidity literature, which often presents its arguments in terms of prices rather than returns. For example, Amihud (2002) investigates the hypothesis that higher expected liquidity raises expected returns, which lowers prices, assuming that liquidity does not a¤ect corporate cash ‡ows.
We therefore investigate whether option illiquidity a¤ects the structure of implied volatilities. Following Duan and Wei (2009), we investigate several aspects of the implied volatility curve by …rst estimating the following model for each …rm i for each moneyness and maturity category used in Section 4
where iv i:t ( k ; T k ) is the implied volatility for option k with maturity T k and moneyness k de…ned as the strike price over the stock price at time t. To ensure that su¢ cient contracts are available, we run the regression every month. Implied volatility and option characteristics are provided by Ivy DB OptionMetrics. We include only months with more than ten contracts available. T k and k are the average time to maturity and moneyness, respectively, for each category. Using these regressions, we obtain for each …rm i a monthly time series i;t which corresponds to the estimated level of implied volatility, and a monthly time series i;t which corresponds to the estimated moneyness slope of the implied volatility. We de…ne e i;t as the residuals plus the intercept from the cross-sectional regression of i;t on the monthly volatility, estimated by the square root of the sum of squared daily returns for the month. This is needed in order to eliminate the …rst-order determinant of implied volatility, similar to the use of adjusted option returns in Section 4.
Using both call and put contracts, we …rst estimate the illiquidity impact on the level of implied volatility by running monthly cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions for the following model e i;t = a 0;t + a 1;t IL O i;t + a 2;t IL S i;t + a 3;t R S i;t + a 4;t b i;t + a 5;t ln(size i;t ) + a 6;t lev i;t + "
where R S i;t is the …rm's stock return, IL O i;t is the average for the month of daily option illiquidity, and IL S i:t is the dollar-volume weighted average of daily stock illiquidity, respectively. The proportion of systematic risk averaged throughout the month is denoted by b i;t and de…ned as in Duan and Wei (2009) . To capture size we use the last daily observation each month and to capture leverage we use the observation available in the previous quarter. As in Section 4, the regression is run using all …rms available for a given moneyness/maturity category. Tables 4 and 5 . An increase in illiquidity decreases current prices, and therefore also the level of implied volatility, and increases expected option returns. Moreover, stock illiquidity, IL S t ; has a positive and signi…cant impact on the level of implied volatility, which is also consistent with the results in Tables 4 and 5 , and with a hedging argument. An increase in stock illiquidity facilitates trading in options to hedge long/short positions in more illiquid stocks. This causes an increase in contemporaneous option prices, i.e. the level of implied volatility. These …ndings suggest illiquidity spillovers between stock and option markets. Overall, we observe a strong and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of both option illiquidity and stock illiquidity on the level of implied volatility across all option categories. The robustness of this e¤ect across all option categories suggests a systematic impact of illiquidity on option prices.
We next examine the e¤ect of option illiquidity on the moneyness slope of the implied volatility curve. It is well known that the data exhibit a smile or smirk in the moneyness dimension, implying that the slope is sometimes negative and sometimes positive. We test the hypothesis that illiquidity increases the absolute value of the slope by estimating Tables 8 and 9 suggest that option illiquidity is an important determinant of the structure of implied volatilities. Stock illiquidity is also an important determinant of the level and slope of implied volatility.
Option Illiquidity: Time Series Evidence
The cross-sectional results in Sections 4 and 5 provide substantial evidence of the importance of both option and stock illiquidity for option returns at the …rm level. We now present time series evidence for portfolios. Portfolio-level time-series evidence can potentially yield additional insights as …rm-speci…c risks are largely diversi…ed away in this case. We use the time-series framework of French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) and Amihud (2002) .
Conducting portfolio-level time series analyses is more involved for options than for stocks. We proceed as follows. For each …rm i and for each period t, we compute the option return R O i;t as the equally-weighted average return in (3.1) for all eligible contracts available at time t. For these contracts we also compute the average illiquidity at time t, denote it IL i;t . Some contracts are not available at both times t 1 and time t, due to the data …lters. Therefore, the illiquidity at time t 1 is only computed for the option contracts with quotes available to compute their returns at time t, which ensures that R O i;t , IL i;t and IL i;t 1 are based on the same contracts. As in the cross-sectional regressions, we adjust option returns for variation in the price and volatility of the underlying stock. We do so by regressing the raw option return on the current and lagged stock return and squared stock return and using the residuals from this regression instead of the raw option returns.
Then, as in Section 4.6, we rank the returns into deciles based on IL i;t 1 , and for each decile, we compute the equally weighted average of R O i;t , IL i;t and IL i;t 1 . We also compute the equally weighted average of lagged stock illiquidity IL S i;t 1 for each decile portfolio. We are interested in the time series dynamics of the e¤ect of option illiquidity on option returns at the portfolio level. Following the methodology in Amihud (2002), we test the predictive power of option illiquidity on option returns as well as the e¤ect of a contemporaneous and unexpected shock to option illiquidity on option returns. We estimate the illiquidity shock of each decile, j, in the following time series regression in logarithms, using weekly data: ln (IL j;t ) = ! j;0 + ! j;1 ln IL j;t 1 + v IL j;t (6.1)
We use the residuals from this regression as a proxy for unexpected shocks to option illiquidity, de…ned as IL Based on our cross-sectional …ndings, we expect 1 to be positive and signi…cant. Moreover, we expect 1 to monotonically increase from less illiquid to more illiquid portfolios since we expect the illiquidity impact to be higher for more illiquid assets, similar to Amihud's (2002) …ndings for stocks. Given that lagged illiquidity has a positive impact, the contemporaneous unexpected shock should have a negative e¤ect on option returns, i.e. an unexpected positive illiquidity shock should decrease current option prices and thus increase expected option returns. Similar to the evidence on the impact of illiquidity on stock market returns (Amihud, 2002) , we also expect the e¤ect of 2 to be stronger, i.e. more negative, for more illiquid portfolios.
Finally, the expected sign for the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on expected option returns can be motivated by the discussion in Cetin et al (2006) . A positive illiquidity shock in the stock market increases the cost of the replicating portfolio and therefore increases the current option price. Since options become more expensive for more illiquid stocks, the expected return on these options decrease. Moreover, they decrease more for more illiquid options. We therefore expect 3 to be negative.
The illiquidity portfolio level results for all option categories are reported in Table 10 . The results are more pronounced for the call options reported in Panel A. For both shortterm and long-term OTM calls, 1 is positive and signi…cant and increases with portfolio illiquidity. This coe¢ cient is higher for short-term contracts, suggesting higher illiquidity premia for short-term calls. The unexpected illiquidity has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on short-term OTM calls and the magnitude of this e¤ect is monotonically increasing in portfolio illiquidity. This is similar to the e¤ect of stock illiquidity on stock returns (Amihud, 2002) . The unexpected illiquidity shock is only signi…cant for high-illiquidity portfolios and for longterm OTM calls but its coe¢ cient has the expected negative sign and monotonically increases in absolute value with portfolio illiquidity. The results on option illiquidity are qualitatively similar across ATM and ITM short-term and long-term contracts, but the e¤ect is more pronounced for short-term contracts. This is consistent with Amihud and Mendelson's (1986) clientele e¤ect, where the holders of longer term assets are able to amortize illiquidity costs due to longer holding periods and thus require lower compensation for bearing illiquidity costs. This assumes of course that long-term options are indeed held for longer periods on average.
We obtain similar results for put options in Panel B, but with the exception of OTM put options, the results for call options are stronger in terms of magnitude and signi…cance than for put options. Even though the two are linked via put-call parity, for ATM and ITM contracts, call options appear to be more exposed to illiquidity in the option and stock markets.
Finally, we …nd that stock illiquidity has a negative and signi…cant impact on expected option returns across both calls and puts and for di¤erent maturity and moneyness categories. The pattern of 3 across illiquidity portfolios is not monotone. It is higher in absolute value for medium-illiquidity portfolios and lower for extreme decile portfolios. This suggests that even though stock illiquidity does a¤ect option returns, it represents a di¤erent type of risk than option illiquidity.
Conclusion
We present evidence on illiquidity premia in equity option markets. Using cross-sectional and time series evidence, we …nd an economically and statistically signi…cant positive impact of option illiquidity on expected option returns. The cross-sectional results obtain in univariate regressions, as well as in multivariate regressions controlling for returns and volatility of the underlying equity, lagged option returns, and a variety of other variables. The results are robust across six di¤erent moneyness and maturity categories, and estimates obtained using the cross-section of implied volatilities con…rm the positive impact of option illiquidity on option returns. Our results are similar to the …ndings of Amihud (2002) , who reports a positive e¤ect of stock illiquidity on stock returns. A shock to option illiquidity decreases the current price and increases expected option returns, thus compensating traders for holding illiquid contracts.
The illiquidity of the underlying stocks also has an economically signi…cant impact on option returns. A positive shock to stock illiquidity increase current option prices and decreases expected option returns. This e¤ect is consistent with an increase in hedging trades due to higher stock illiquidity: Whenever stock market illiquidity increases, the higher stock transaction costs increase the cost of replicating the option, which in turn increases the option price and reduces its expected return. 
Figure 2B Aggregate Illiquidity for Put Options
We plot aggregate daily illiquidity measures for put options. The illiquidity measure is based on the average relative bid-ask spread, where ask and bid are end of day closing quoted ask and bid prices available from Ivy DB OptionMetrics. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 We provide descriptive statistics for daily and weekly option returns. First we compute the descriptive statistics for each firm and then we take the cross-sectional averages of these statistics. We report the mean (in percentages), the standard deviation, the skewness, the kurtosis, the first-order autocorrelation of returns (1), and the first-order autocorrelation of absolute value of returns, (1). The option returns are computed using closing bid-ask price midpoints. OTM (out-of-the-money) corresponds to 0.125 < ≤ 0.375 for calls and −0.375 < ≤ −0.125 for puts. ATM (at-the-money) corresponds to 0.375 < ≤ 0.625 for calls and −0.625 < ≤ −0.375 for puts. ITM (in-the-money) corresponds to 0.625 < ≤ 0.875 for calls and −0.875 < ≤ −0.625 for puts. Short-term options have maturity between 20 and 70 days, whereas long-term options have maturity between 71 and 180 days. The option data are from Ivy DB OptionMetrics. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007.
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Table 2 Illiquidity Measures
We present summary statistics for the illiquidity measures in percentages (in Panel A) and the correlations between the illiquidity measures for call and put options (in Panels B and C respectively). Stock illiquidity is estimated from TAQ (Trade and Quote) intra-day data as the dollar-volume weighted average of the effective relative spread for each day. The option illiquidity measure is based on the average relative bid-ask spread, where ask and bid are end-of-day closing quoted ask and bid prices available from Ivy DB OptionMetrics. For each firm and for each day, we compute the average of the relative bid-ask spreads of all the available options in a given category, and then we take the mean, the minimum, the maximum, the standard deviation and the first-order autocorrelation, (1), of these averages. We report the cross-sectional averages of these statistics in Panel A. We compute the cross-sectional correlations between the illiquidity measures on each day and report the time-series averages of these correlations in Panel B for call options and Panel C for put options. The option data are from Ivy DB OptionMetrics. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. options in a given category, and then we take the mean, the minimum, the maximum, the standard deviation and the first-order autocorrelation (1) of these averages. We compute Amihud's illiquidity measure on a weekly basis for each firm, and we take the mean, the minimum, the maximum, the standard deviation and the firstorder autocorrelation (1) of these weekly measures. We report the cross-sectional averages of these statistics. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Call Options
Table 4 Fama-MacBeth Regressions for Daily Adjusted Option Returns
We report the results of cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions for daily adjusted call and put option returns ( � ), i.e. the residuals plus the intercept from the regression of option returns on stock returns, lagged stock returns and squared stock returns. We include the lagged values of the following regressors: option illiquidity , the illiquidity of the underlying asset , the conditional volatility, which is estimated using a GARCH(1,1) model, the systematic risk proportion b, which corresponds to the square root of the R 2 from the regression of stock returns on Fama-French and momentum factors, and the logarithm of size and firm leverage. The option illiquidity measure is based on the average relative bid-ask spread, where ask and bid are end-of-day closing quoted ask and bid prices available from Ivy DB OptionMetrics. Stock illiquidity is obtained as the dollar-volume average of the effective relative spreads from TAQ. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. The symbols *, † and ‡ denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels using Fama-MacBeth t-statistics with Newey-West correction for serial correlation, using 22 lags. We report the results of cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions for weekly adjusted call and put option returns ( � ), i.e. the residuals plus the intercept from the regression of option returns on stock returns, lagged stock returns and squared stock returns. We include the lagged values of the following regressors: option illiquidity , computed from relative daily quoted bid-ask spreads, , the dollar-volume weighted average of daily stock illiquidity for the previous week, the conditional volatility of returns, computed as the square root of the sum of squared daily returns for the previous week, b, the average of daily systematic risk proportion for the previous week, the logarithm of the firm size and the firm leverage. We use the size observed on the last day of the previous week, and the leverage from the previous quarter. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. The symbols *, † and ‡ denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels using Fama-MacBeth t-statistics with Newey-West correction for serial correlation, using 8 lags. 
Table 6 Daily Portfolio Strategies
We show portfolio sorting results for call options (Panel A) and put options (Panel B). Each day, we sort the firms into deciles based on their lagged option illiquidity . For each decile, we report (in percentages) the time-series average of raw option returns , the net (after transaction costs) option returns, -Long for the long position and -Short for the short position, stock returns , the option quoted relative bid-ask spread , the effective relative bid-ask spread for the stock, and size in millions of dollars. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. For each month and for each category, we run the following regression using all observed options within the month. The regression is run separately for call and put options , ( , ) = , + , ( − ̅ ) + , ( − � ) + , , = 1,2, … . where , � , � is the implied volatility for an option with moneyness and maturity . The subscripts t, i and k correspond to month t, firm i and contract k, respectively. K is the number of contracts available for a given month and category. We consider only months for which K is larger than ten. For each firm i, we obtain a monthly time series for , which corresponds to the estimated level of implied volatility. Then, for each month t, we run the following regression is the monthly average of daily option illiquidity for the K contracts used to run the first regression, and is the dollarvolume weighted average of daily stock illiquidity.
Panel A: Call Options
is the monthly stock return. The option illiquidity is the relative bid-ask spread and the stock illiquidity is the effective bid-ask spread estimated from TAQ data.
is the systematic risk proportion, which corresponds to the square root of the R 2 from the regression of stock returns on Fama-French and momentum factors. We use the monthly average of the daily systematic risk proportion. ln ( ) and are respectively the logarithm of firm size and the firm leverage. We use the firm size observed on the last day of the month and leverage from the last available quarter. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. The symbols *, † and ‡ denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels using Fama-MacBeth t-statistics with Newey-West correction for serial correlation, with 8 lags. For each month and for each option category, we run the following regression using all observed options within the month. The regression is run separately for call and put options , ( , ) = , + , ( − ̅ ) + , ( − � ) + , , = 1,2, … . where , � , � is the implied volatility for an option with moneyness and maturity . The subscripts t, i and k correspond to month t, firm i and contract k, respectively. K is the number of contracts available for the considered month and category. We consider only months for which K is larger than ten. For each firm i, we obtain a monthly time series for , which corresponds to the estimated moneyness-slope of implied volatility. Then, for each month t, we run the following regression is the average across the month of daily option illiquidity of the K contracts used to run the first regression, and is the dollar-volume weighted average of daily stock illiquidity. is the monthly stock return. The option illiquidity is the relative bid-ask spread, and the stock illiquidity is the effective bid-ask spread estimated from TAQ data.
is the systematic risk proportion, which corresponds to the square root of the R 2 from the regression of stock returns on Fama-French and momentum factors. We take the monthly average of the daily systematic risk proportion. ln ( ) and are respectively the logarithm of firm size and the firm leverage. We use the firm size observed on the last day of the month and the leverage from the last available quarter. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. The symbols *, † and ‡ denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels using Fama-MacBeth t-statistics with Newey-West correction for serial correlation, using 8 lags. Each week, we sort the firms into deciles based on their lagged option illiquidity. The lagged illiquidity corresponds to the average of relative bid-ask spreads on the previous Friday of the contracts used to compute returns for the week. For each decile j, we take the average across firms of illiquidity, lagged illiquidity, and adjusted option returns, which are the residuals from time-series regression of option returns on current and lagged stock returns and squared stock returns. We thus obtain a weekly time-series for , , and � , over the entire sample period. Then we run the following regression:
ln ( , ) = ,0 + ,1 ln ( , −1 ) + , . Defining the unexpected illiquidity by , = , , we estimate the following time-series regression:
� , = 0 + 1 ln ( , −1 ) + 2 , + 3 ln( , −1 ) + ,
where , −1 is lagged stock illiquidity. The sample includes the S&P 500 constituents as of December 31, 2007 for which options trade throughout the entire sample period, which is from January 1996 through December 2007. The symbols *, † and ‡ denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels with Newey-West correction for serial correlation, using 8 lags.
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